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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (e), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. DOES DEFENDANT CAREE F. MCDONALD 
("MCDONALD") HAVE A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
FOR A "PETTY" OFFENSE SUCH AS A MINOR 
TRAFFIC VIOLATION? 
This issue is a conclusion of law, and should be reviewed on 
a "correctness" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
II. IS IT WITHIN THE POWER OF THE TRIAL 
COURT, PRIOR TO TRIAL, TO LIMIT THE 
POTENTIAL SENTENCE THAT MAY BE IMPOSED BY 
REDUCING THE POTENTIAL SENTENCE FOR A 
SPEEDING VIOLATION FROM A CLASS "C" 
MISDEMEANOR TO AN INFRACTION? 
This issue is a conclusion of law, and should be reviewed on 
a "correctness" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING MCDONALD'S REQUEST THAT THE 
HEARING ON HER MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL BE 
HELD PRIOR TO THE DAY OF TRIAL, AND IN 
DENYING HER MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AFTER 
THE COURT HAD DENIED THE MOTION FOR JURY 
TRIAL? 
This issue is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and should be reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" standard. 
State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993). 
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IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN SENTENCING MCDONALD TO A FINE THAT 
EXCEEDS THE RECOMMENDED FINE SET FORTH IN 
THE UNIFORM FINE SCHEDULE? 
This issue is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and should be reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" standard. 
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI: 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10: 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in 
capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In 
courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four 
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In 
civil cases, three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. 
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 1896 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
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committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that examination is 
limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless 
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution 
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined 
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or 
rule. 1994 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-3-204: 
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction - Term of imprisonment. 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be 
sentenced to imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term 
not exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term 
not exceeding six months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term 
not exceeding ninety days. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-3-301: 
76-3-301. Fines of persons. 
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to 
pay a fine, not exceeding: 
(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first 
degree or second degree; 
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third 
degree; 
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction; 
(d) $1,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction; 
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or 
infraction conviction; and 
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by 
statute. 
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(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, 
association, partnership, government, or governmental 
instrumentality. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-3-301.5: 
76-3-301.5. Uniform fine schedule - Judicial Council. 
(1) The Judicial Council shall establish a uniform 
recommended fine schedule for each offense under Subsection 
76-3-301 (1) . 
(a) The fine for each offense shall proportionally 
reflect the seriousness of the offense and other factors 
as determined in writing by the Judicial Council. 
(b) The schedule shall be reviewed annually by the 
Judicial Council. 
(c) The fines shall be collected under Section 
77-18-1. 
(2) The schedule shall incorporate: 
(a) criteria for determining aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances; and 
(b) guidelines for enhancement or reduction of the 
fine, based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
(3) Presentence investigation reports shall include 
documentation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as 
determined under the criteria, and a recommended fine under 
the schedule. 
(4) The Judicial Council shall also establish a separate 
uniform recommended fine schedule for the juvenile court and 
by rule provide for its implementation. 
(5) This section does not prohibit the court from in its 
discretion imposing no fine, or a fine in any amount up to and 
including the maximum fine, for the offense. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6: 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by 
counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed 
against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district where the offense is alleged to 
have been committed; 
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(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with 
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the 
business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the 
same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to 
pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband nor a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict 
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or 
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been 
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by 
a magistrate. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4: 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be 
prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person 
having reason to believe the offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense 
for which the defendant is being prosecuted by using the name 
given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating 
in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to 
give the defendant notice of the charge. An information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient 
to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged 
where appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, 
manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless 
necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and 
judgments may be described by any name or description by which 
they are generally known or by which they may be identified 
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such 
things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither 
presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be 
stated.. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language 
from an indictment or information. 
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(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to 
be amended at any time before verdict if no additional or 
different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or 
information may be amended so as to state the offense with 
such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the 
same offense upon the same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or 
indictment are required to inform a defendant of the nature 
and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion 
for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at 
arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later 
time as the court may permit. The court may, on its own 
motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of 
particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject 
to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and 
contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a 
statement of factual information needed to set forth the 
essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held 
invalid because any name contained therein may be incorrectly 
spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, 
excuse or proviso contained in the statute creating or 
defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according 
to their usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined by 
law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive 
shall not invalidate the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an 
indictment or information was based shall be endorsed thereon 
before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the 
validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on 
application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting 
attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish 
the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names 
are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall 
issue directing it to appear before the magistrate. Appearance 
may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a 
corporation shall be the same as against a natural person. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a prosecution and conviction in the Third 
Judicial District Court, West Valley Department, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for a violation of Section 41-6-46, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, "Speeding." 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Prosecution in this case was commenced by the filing of 
charges against Defendant Caree F. McDonald on February 5, 1996. 
The actual date of the speeding violation, which was detected by 
the use of photo-radar, was January 6, 1996. (Record, p. 1.) On 
April 15, 1996, the City filed an Information, formally charging 
McDonald with a violation of Section 41-6-46. (Record, p. 5.) A 
pretrial conference was held before Judge Esqueda on May 1, 1996. 
McDonald was represented by counsel at the pretrial hearing; 
however, the case was not resolved and was set for a bench trial. 
On May 7, 1996, McDonald filed a Motion to Dismiss (Record, 
pp. 8-9), to which the City filed a response (Record, pp. 27-31). 
On June 7, 1996, the City filed an Amended Information. 
(Record, pp. 32-33.) The Amended Information contained the same 
speeding charges as the original Information, but reduced the 
penalty from class NNC" misdemeanor to infraction status. This 
Amended Information was accepted by the trial court. On June 13, 
1996, McDonald filed a Motion for Jury Trial. 
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On January 20, 1996, following a hearing on the matter, the 
trial judge denied McDonald's Motion to Dismiss and her Motion for 
Jury Trial, and then recessed to handle other matters. Upon 
resuming this case, the trial court denied McDonald's Motion for 
Continuance and proceeded to trial. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
At the bench trial on June 20, 1996, the trial court convicted 
McDonald of speeding. The trial judge imposed fines and 
assessments in the amount of $60 and required McDonald to complete 
traffic school. (Record, pp. 44-45.) McDonald's Notice of Appeal 
was filed on July 16, 1996. (Record, p. 55.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. MCDONALD DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO A 
JURY TRIAL FOR A "PETTY" OFFENSE SUCH AS 
A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION. 
There exists no Utah case law interpreting the "right to a 
jury" provisions of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to look to interpretations of analogous provisions of 
the United States Constitution for guidance in interpreting the 
Utah Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has 
unequivocally determined that no right to a jury under the United 
States Constitution exists for "petty" offenses. The 
classification of an offense as "petty" is determined by examining 
potential penalties and is based upon the historical lack of a 
right to a jury trial in "petty" cases. The interpretation of the 
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Utah Constitution based upon this type of analysis leads to the 
conclusion that McDonald was not entitled to a jury trial 
regardless of whether she was charged with a class "C" misdemeanor 
or an infraction, since both would be classified as "petty" 
offenses. This is especially true since the Utah Constitution 
provision regarding the right to a jury trial was drafted in more 
narrow language than the analogous United States Constitution 
provision. McDonald's alternate arguments founded upon Article I, 
Section 10 of the Utah Constitution and Section 77-1-6 of the Utah 
Code likewise do not establish her right to a jury trial. 
II. IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF THE TRIAL 
COURT, PRIOR TO TRIAL, TO ELIMINATE 
INCARCERATION AS A POTENTIAL PENALTY THAT 
MAY BE IMPOSED, BY REDUCING THE POTENTIAL 
SENTENCE FOR A SPEEDING VIOLATION FROM A 
CLASS "C" MISDEMEANOR TO AN INFRACTION. 
McDonald's argument regarding the reduction in the penalty for 
speeding from a class "C" misdemeanor to an infraction focuses on 
the power of the prosecutor to make such a change. This argument 
mischaracterizes the issue. It is not the power of the prosecutor, 
but rather the discretion of the trial court judge, that allows 
this reduction in penalty to take place. The only effect of 
reducing the charge from a class XXC" misdemeanor to an infraction 
is a reduction in the penalty that may be imposed by the trial 
judge. By allowing amendment of the charge down to an infraction, 
the trial judge is agreeing, prior to trial, to exclude 
incarceration from among his sentencing options. Trial court 
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judges in Utah are granted wide latitude with regard to their 
sentencing decisions, and this is simply an action within the 
judge's discretion with regard to sentencing. 
McDonald's arguments regarding the City's and the trial court 
judge's failure to follow Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure are without merit. Contrary to McDonald's assertion, 
Rule 4 (d) does not require the City to petition the court for 
permission to file an Amended Information. Also, McDonald has 
provided no credible argument that a reduction in the possible 
penalty associated with her offense has deprived her of any 
substantial right. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING MCDONALD'S REQUEST 
THAT THE HEARING ON HER MOTION FOR JURY 
TRIAL BE HELD PRIOR TO THE DAY OF TRIAL, 
AND IN DENYING HER MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT HAD DENIED THE 
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL. 
Utah trial courts are granted a great deal of discretion with 
respect to scheduling matters and granting or denying Motions for 
Continuance. Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the trial 
court's decisions will not be disturbed on appeal. In this case, 
McDonald has failed to show any abuse of discretion whatsoever on 
the part of the trial judge. Her arguments are in conflict and 
confusing. First, she argues that the hearing on her Motion for 
Jury Trial should not have been held on the same day the case was 
set for a bench trial. Part of her rationale on this argument is 
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that the court was not prepared to go forward with a jury trial on 
that date and would have had to continue the case until a jury 
could be assembled. Then, she makes the argument that the denial 
of the Motion for Continuance deprived her of her right to 
adequately prepare for a bench trial, since she had apparently 
arrived at court prepared to conduct a jury trial. McDonald had 
received notice that a bench trial was to be held on June 20, 1996, 
and admits in her argument that she knew a jury trial could not be 
conducted on that day. If she was unprepared for a bench trial on 
June 20, it is simply through her own negligence and not through 
any fault of the courts. This argument by McDonald is without 
merit, and should be disregarded by this Court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN SENTENCING MCDONALD TO A 
FINE THAT EXCEEDS THE RECOMMENDED FINE 
SET FORTH IN THE UNIFORM FINE SCHEDULE. 
It is well established that Utah trial court judges have wide 
discretion in their sentencing decisions. Those decisions will not 
be overturned on appeal unless they are inherently unfair, 
excessive, or such that no reasonable person* would take the view 
adopted by the trial court. In this case, the bail was set at $57. 
The sentence imposed by the trial court was a fine of $60 and 
attendance at traffic school, which costs an additional $30. Fines 
and assessments in this case are obviously within the $0 to $750 
range of fines applicable to infractions. McDonald makes no 
credible argument supporting her claim that the fine is excessive 
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or unfair. Also, her reliance on the Uniform Fine Schedule in 
establishing what she believes the fine should have been is 
misplaced. The Criminal Code provision establishing the Uniform 
Fine Schedule specifically grants judges the discretion to impose 
any fine allowed by law, whether or not it is in conformance with 
the recommended fine in the Fine Schedule. Also, McDonald is 
incorrect in stating that the bail for this offense was $50. The 
Record clearly indicates that the bail set in this case was $57. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. MCDONALD DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO A 
JURY TRIAL FOR A "PETTY" OFFENSE SUCH AS 
A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION. 
McDonald does not have a right to a jury trial in a case 
involving a "petty" offense, regardless of whether that offense is 
classified as a class "C" misdemeanor or an infraction. McDonald 
points to the Utah Constitution as the source of her perceived 
right to a jury trial. However, a close analysis of the language 
of the Utah Constitution reveals that no such right exists. 
Utah courts may determine that it is appropriate to interpret 
state constitutional provisions differently from federal 
constitutional provisions. West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 
999 (Utah 1994). However, the Utah appellate courts have yet to 
render an opinion as to whether or not the Utah Constitution 
provides a right to a trial by jury in so-called "petty" offenses. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the United States Supreme 
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Court's interpretation of similar provisions of the United States 
Constitution and to apply that analysis to the language of the Utah 
Constitution. 
McDonald relies upon Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, which states in part: "In criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall have the right . . . to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed . . . . Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
The analogous provision of the United States Constitution is found 
in the Sixth Amendment, which states: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed . . . . U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court held that, "There is a category of petty crimes or 
offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
provision." Duncan, at 159. The Duncan court found that 
historically there had been a class of "petty" crimes that had not 
been tried before juries. The court found that the framers of the 
United States Constitution intended to continue this practice when 
drafting the Sixth Amendment and that only "serious" crimes invoke 
the right to a jury trial. Duncan, at 159-160. 
The case of Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 
(1989), reaffirmed the holding in Duncan and provided a test for 
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lower courts to determine whether a criminal defendant is entitled 
to a jury trial. In Blanton, the defendants were charged with 
first-time "driving under the influence of alcohol" charges. The 
D.U.I, charges carried a penalty of up to six months' incarceration 
and a fine of up to $1,000. The Blanton court, therefore, was 
dealing with charges carrying a much greater penalty than that 
faced by McDonald, even if her charge is considered to be a class 
"C" misdemeanor. In Utah, a class "C" misdemeanor carries a 
maximum penalty of 90 days in jail and a fine of $750. Utah Code 
Ann., §§ 76-3-204(3) and 76-3-301(1)(e), (1953). 
In Blanton, the United States Supreme Court focused upon the 
penalty attached to a crime in determining whether it was a 
"serious" crime requiring the opportunity for a jury trial, or 
whether the crime could be classified as "petty," in which case, no 
right to a jury trial exists. The Court particularly focused on 
the period of incarceration and stated: 
Primary emphasis, however, must be placed on 
the maximum authorized period of 
incarceration. Penalties such as probation or 
a fine may engender "a significant 
infringement of personal freedom," id., at 
151, but they cannot approximate in severity 
the loss of liberty that a prison term 
entails. Indeed, because incarceration is an 
"intrinsically different" form of punishment, 
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975), it 
is the most powerfuL indication of whether an 
offense is "serious." 
Blanton, at 542. 
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The Court went on to establish six months as the demarcation 
line between "serious" and "petty" offenses. Following its 
previous decision in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the 
Court established that defendants are entitled to jury trials 
whenever the offense for which the person is charged carries a 
maximum authorized term of greater than six months. Blanton, 
at 543. 
The Blanton Court declined to find that an offense carrying a 
maximum prison term of six months or less was automatically a 
"petty" offense. However, the Court established a presumption that 
such an offense is "petty" and stated: 
A defendant is entitled to a jury trial in 
such circumstances only if he can demonstrate 
that any additional statutory penalties, 
viewed in conjunction with the maximum 
authorized period of incarceration, are so 
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative 
determination that the offense in question is 
a "serious" one. This standard, albeit 
somewhat imprecise, should ensure the 
availability of a jury trial in the rare 
situation where a legislature packs an offense 
it deems "serious" with onerous penalties that 
nonetheless "do not puncture the 6-month 
incarceration line." 
Blanton, at 543. 
Last year, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
holding in Blanton. In Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 
(1996), the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled 
to a jury trial, even though he was charged with two counts of 
"obstructing the mail," each of which carried a maximum authorized 
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prison term of six months, so that the aggregate maximum prison 
term exceeded six months. 
The Court in Lewis stated: "The Constitution's guarantee of 
the right to a jury trial extends only to serious offenses." The 
Court also stated: "An offense carrying a maximum prison term of 
six months or less is presumed petty unless the legislature has 
authorized additional statutory penalties so severe as to indicate 
that the legislature considered the offense serious/' Lewis, at 
2166. 
It is clear from the foregoing United States Supreme Court 
analysis and case law that McDonald is not entitled to a jury trial 
on the basis of the language of the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The analysis that lead to this conclusion can 
likewise be applied to the language of Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
As can be seen in the quotations set forth at the beginning of 
this argument, the language of the United States Constitution and 
the language of the Utah Constitution are virtually identical. 
However, there* exists one very important difference. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution begins 
with the phrase, "In all criminal prosecutions . . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) The drafters of the Utah Constitution, however, chose to 
omit the word "all" when drafting the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution begins, "In criminal 
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prosecutions . . . ." By omitting the word "all," the drafters of 
the Utah Constitution clearly intended to narrow the scope of the 
jury trial right in the Utah Constitution in comparison with the 
analogous provision of the United States Constitution. 
As was demonstrated above in Blanton and the other United 
States Supreme Court cases cited, the United States Constitution, 
which contains the inclusive word "all," has not been interpreted 
to include "petty" offenses. Based on the federal analysis and the 
difference in language between the two Constitutions, it seems 
elementary that if the right to a jury trial for an offense 
carrying a maximum penalty of 90 days' incarceration and $750 fine 
does not invoke the right to a jury trial under the expansive 
United States Constitution, then it certainly would not trigger 
such a right under the more narrowly written Utah Constitution. 
McDonald makes the additional argument that the Utah 
Constitution affords her a right to trial by jury, even if the 
charges against her are characterized as civil. This argument is 
clearly inapplicable in this case, since the Record is devoid of 
any indication that the offense committed by McDonald was 
considered to be a civil offense. To the contrary, the City and 
the trial court considered the offense to be a criminal offense 
(either a class "C" misdemeanor or an infraction), albeit a "petty" 
criminal offense. 
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Even if McDonald was correct in categorizing this case as 
civil, her arguments are unpersuasive. McDonald's support for her 
"civil" jury trial argument rests primarily on the language in 
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution. She interprets the 
language NNa jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded" as 
requiring a jury trial in all civil cases in which a jury demand is 
filed. This is clearly not the law in Utah. In Hyatt v. Hill, 714 
P.2d 299 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court, in construing the 
meaning of Article I, Section 10, stated: "The constitutional 
right to a trial by jury is preserved and currently exists only in 
actions so triable when the Constitution was adopted." Hyatt, at 
301. The Court has also stated that the right to a jury trial 
"extends only to cases that would have been cognizable at law at 
the time the Constitution was adopted." Zions First National Bank 
v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1990). 
In a recent case, which determined that Article I, Section 10 of 
the Utah Constitution does not provide the right to a jury trial in 
parental rights termination proceedings, the Utah Court of Appeals 
concluded that if the action did not exist when the State 
Constitution was adopted, it was unnecessary to address whether or 
not it was the type of action that would have required a jury trial 
at that time. T.R.B. v. State of Utah, 311 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). 
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In applying this standard to the instant case, it is plain 
that no right to a jury trial based upon Article I, Section 10 is 
applicable. The annotations to Section 41-6-46 of the Utah Code, 
the section under which McDonald was convicted, indicate that the 
statute was first enacted in 1953. In fact, the oldest section 
contained in Article 6, Chapter 6 of Title 41, "Speed 
Restrictions," appears from the annotations to have been adopted in 
1941. Since the Utah Constitution was adopted in 1896, before the 
invention of motor vehicles, it appears extremely unlikely that 
speeding violations existed at the time of the adoption of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, McDonald's argument must fail. 
This historically-based rationale, which has been used by the 
Utah courts in interpreting Article I, Section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution, is philosophically very similar to the United States 
Supreme Court's historical analysis of the Sixth Amendment referred 
to earlier with regard to the interpretation of Article I, 
Section 12. For example, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968), the United States Supreme Court stated: 
So-called petty offenses were tried without 
juries both in England and in the colonies and 
have always been held to be exempt from the 
otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth 
Amendment's jury trial provisions. There is 
no substantial evidence that the framers 
intended to depart from this established 
common-law practice. 
Duncan, at 160. This rationale has also been relied upon by other 
state courts, e.g., Austin v. Denver, 462 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1969). 
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McDonald also makes the statutory argument that Section 77-1-6 
of the Utah Code provides a state law basis for the right to a jury 
trial. SectLon 77-1-6 states: "In criminal prosecutions the 
defendant is entitled . . . (f) To a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury . . . ." This statute is virtually identical to the 
language contained in ArtLcle I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. The statute creates no right greater than that 
embodied m the Constitution; therefore, if Article I, Section 12 
does not provide McDonald with a right to a jury trial in this 
case, neither would Section 77-1-6. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Record contains no 
references to state constitutional provisions in the arguments made 
to the trial court. In previous cases, this Court has declined to 
address state constitutional issues that were not raised before the 
trial court. In those cases, it was found to be appropriate to 
proceed under a federal constitutional law analysis State v. 
Dudley, 847 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the Utah 
Constitution creates no right to a jury trial for a "petty" 
offense. Since there is no case law interpreting the applicable 
sections of the Utah Constitution, the courts may look to 
interpretation of analogous provisions of the United States 
Constitution for guidance in interpreting the Utah Constitution. 
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The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally determined that 
no right to a jury under the United States Constitution would exist 
in this case, since McDonald, at worst, faced a maximum penalty of 
90 days in jail and a $750 fine. This analysis by the United 
States Supreme Court was based upon both the classification of the 
offense as "petty" due to its relatively minor penalties, and also 
upon the historical lack of a right to a jury trial in "petty" 
cases. An analysis of the Utah Constitution based upon these 
factors leads to the same conclusion; specifically, that McDonald 
is not entitled to a jury trial in a case involving a minor 
offense. This is especially true since the Utah Constitution 
provisions regarding the right to a jury trial were drafted in more 
narrow language than the United States Constitution. McDonald's 
alternate arguments founded upon Article I, Section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution and Section 77-1-6 of the Utah Code likewise do not 
establish her right to a jury trial. Regardless of whether the 
speeding offense that McDonald was charged with is considered a 
class "C" misdemeanor or an infraction, she has no right to a jury 
trial under the Utah Constitution, the United States Constitution, 
or the statutes of the State of Utah. 
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II. IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF THE TRIAL 
COURT, PRIOR TO TRIAL, TO ELIMINATE 
INCARCERATION AS A POTENTIAL PENALTY THAT 
MAY BE IMPOSED, BY REDUCING THE POTENTIAL 
SENTENCE FOR A SPEEDING VIOLATION FROM A 
CLASS "C" MISDEMEANOR TO AN INFRACTION. 
In this case, it was proper for the trial judge to allow 
amendment of the Information, charging McDonald with speeding, from 
a class "C" misdemeanor to an infraction. McDonald, in her Brief, 
mistakenly focuses on the power of the prosecutor to make such an 
amendment rather than on the power of the trial judge. 
While it is true that the Amended Information was filed with 
the court by the prosecutor, it lies solely within the discretion 
of the trial court judge whether to accept such an amendment. 
Rule 4 (d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the 
court may permit an Information to be amended. The court does not 
have to accept any amendment filed by the prosecutor. 
When looked upon in that light, the analysis of this issue 
changes substantially. The only effect of reducing the charge from 
a class "C" misdemeanor to an infraction is a reduction in the 
penalty that may be imposed by the trial judge. A class "C" 
misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail 
(Section 76-3-204 (3) ) and a fine of $750 (Section 76-3-301 (1) (e) ) , 
while an infraction is punishable by a maximum penalty of a fine of 
$750 (Section 76-3-301(1) (e)), with no incarceration permitted. In 
effect, by allowing amendment of the charge down to an infraction, 
the trial judge is agreeing, prior to trial, to eliminate 
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incarceration from his sentencing options. The crime being charged 
and its elements do not change whatsoever; this is simply an action 
within the judge's discretion with regard to sentencing. 
Trial court judges in Utah are granted a wide latitude with 
regard to their sentencing decisions. Their decisions regarding 
sentencing may be overruled only upon a showing of abuse of 
discretion, which has been described as "inherently unfair" or a 
"clearly excessive sentence." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). The Appellee is unaware of any Utah case law that 
limits the trial judge's sentencing discretion solely to post-trial 
sentencing decisions. 
The analysis is similar to that conducted by the United States 
Supreme Court in a Sixth Amendment "right to the assistance of 
counsel" case. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the 
Supreme Court held that if the trial court judge fails to afford a 
defendant the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his 
defense, it had the effect of limiting the trial judge's sentencing 
options to non-incarceration penalties. The same analysis can be 
applied here. By declaring that he is going to consider the 
offense to be an infraction prior to trial, the trial court judge 
has limited himself to non-incarceration penalties. McDonald has 
not been harmed by this action. To the contrary, McDonald was 
benefitted by being relieved of the potential of being 
incarcerated. 
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McDonald argues that her right to a jury trial was eliminated 
when the charge was amended to an infraction. However, as was 
demonstrated in Argument I above, McDonald had no right to a jury 
trial even if the charge had remained a class "C" misdemeanor. 
Assuming arguendo that McDonald does have a jury trial right when 
charged with a class "C" misdemeanor, McDonald's two arguments that 
her rights were substantially impacted by the reduction in the 
penalty are still not persuasive. 
First, she argues that the charge was reduced for the sole 
purpose of avoiding a jury trial. This charge is not based upon 
facts contained in the Record. To the contrary, at the motion 
hearing regarding the Amendec Information, the prosecutor stated: 
"The City's interest is we don't have the desire to give the 
Defendant the possibility, hcwever slim, of facing jail time; and 
we believe we have the discretion in prosecuting to represent those 
interests in not trying to seek a penalty that has the possibility 
of jail time." (Record, p. 73.) Furthermore, the trial judge, in 
denying the Defendant's objection to the Amended Information, 
stated: "I don't question the City's motives." (Record, p. 74.) 
Second, McDonald argues that the reduction in penalty has 
deprived her of her substantial right to a jury trial. This is a 
disingenious argument. In effect, McDonald is arguing that she has 
a right to face the maximum penalty it is within the judge's power 
to impose. Clearly, McDonald possesses no such right. It is 
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within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine what charge 
shall be brought', and within the discretion of the trial court to 
determine what penalty shall be imposed. McDonald has no "right" 
to face the maximum penalty. If the potential penalty is reduced 
to the level of an infraction, such as in this case, McDonald no 
longer possesses a right to a jury trial, for the reasons set forth 
previously in this Brief and based upon Section 77-1-6(2) (e)of the 
Utah Code. 
McDonald makes several additional arguments regarding the 
reduction in the penalty associated with the speeding violation. 
All of these arguments are meritless. She argues that the City is 
violating Section 41-6-16 of the Utah Code, which indicates that 
local authorities may not enact or enforce rules or ordinances in 
conflict with provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code. This argument 
is clearly inapplicable, since there is no allegation or indication 
in the Record that the City has enacted any rule or ordinance that 
conflicts with the Motor Vehicle Code as specified in 
Section 41-6-16. 
McDonald also argues that the trial court and the City failed 
to follow the provisions of Rule 4 (d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure in amending the Information. Specifically, McDonald 
charges that NN. . . the City amended its Information without 
petitioning the trial court for permission . . . . (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 18.) 
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Rule 4 (d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not 
require the City to petition the court, by motion or otherwise, nor 
does it require the court to hold a hearing prior to amending an 
Information. Rule 4(d) states, in part, as follows: "The court 
may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time 
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and 
the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." The 
trial court followed the proper procedure in this case, and, even 
though she filed no objection to the Amended Information, 
McDonald's concerns were heard by the court at the hearing on her 
Motion for Jury Trial. 
An analysis of the Amended Information, in light of the 
language of Rule 4(d), leads to the conclusion that the court made 
a proper ruling. First, no additional or different offense was 
charged in the Amended Information. The charge remained a 
violation of Section 41-6-46 of the Utah Code. The only change 
contained in the Amended Information was a reduction in the 
possible sentence to be imposed. Also, the substantial rights of 
McDonald were not prejudiced. As has been stated previously in 
this Brief, McDonald possessed no right to a jury trial under 
either the original Information or the Amended Information. A 
right that she does not possess cannot be a substantial right. 
Even if the court determines that there is a jury trial right in 
the case of a class XXC" misdemeanor but not in the case of an 
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infraction, McDonald's rights are still not prejudiced. By 
reducing the potential penalty to be applied to McDonald, she is no 
longer facing the possibility of incarceration and, therefore, is 
no longer entitled to a jury trial. As was argued previously, the 
only right that has been affected by the reduction in potential 
penalty is her perceived right to face the maximum potential 
penalty associated with her crime. This is a right that simply 
does not exist and, therefore, is inappropriate for consideration 
by the court with regard to the impact of Rule 4(d). 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court 
possesses the sentencing discretion to reduce, prior to trial, the 
potential penalty faced by a defendant, by reducing the 
classification of a crime from a class XXC" misdemeanor to an 
infraction and, therefore, eliminating the potential for 
incarceration as a penalty. The Record reveals that the Amended 
Information was filed and treated by the trial judge in accordance 
with Rule 4 (d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and, 
therefore, that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
permitting the Information to be amended. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING MCDONALD'S REQUEST 
THAT THE HEARING ON HER MOTION FOR JURY 
TRIAL BE HELD PRIOR TO THE DAY OF TRIAL, 
AND IN DENYING HER MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT HAD DENIED THE 
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL. 
McDonald argues that the trial court judge abused his 
discretion by holding the hearing on her Motion for Jury Trial on 
the same day that the bench trial had been scheduled. She further 
asserts that the trial court judge abused his discretion by denying 
her Motion for Continuance, which was made orally to the court 
following the court's denial cf the Motion for Jury Trial and prior 
to commencement of the bench trial. McDonald's Brief completely 
fails to provide this Court with any facts upon which it could 
determine that the trial court abused its discretion in scheduling 
the hearing and in denying the Motion for Continuance. 
The Appellee has been unable to locate any Utah case law 
regarding the discretion given to a trial court in scheduling 
matters appearing before the court. However, it is well 
established in Utah courts that trial court judges control their 
own calendars. Surely, this is an area in which trial court judges 
would be given considerable freedom under the principles of 
appellate review discussed by Chief Justice Zimmerman in State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Closely related, since it also involves a scheduling issue, is 
the denial of a Motion for Continuance. Utah appellate courts have 
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consistently held that the decision to grant or deny a continuance 
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State 
v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State v. 
Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, McDonald has failed to show any abuse of 
discretion whatsoever on the part of the trial court judge. 
McDonald admits in her Brief that any scheduling problems created 
by holding the hearing on the Motion for Jury Trial on the day 
scheduled for a bench trial could have been easily corrected by the 
court, since the court could have issued a continuance for the 
purpose of assembling a jury if it had granted the Motion. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 22.) 
Furthermore, McDonald's arguments that she was prejudiced by 
the decisions of the trial court are without merit. First, she 
claims that she was deprived of the opportunity to negotiate or 
accept a plea bargain. This argument ignores the facts of the 
case. On May 1, 1996, the judge conducted a pretrial conference in 
this case, at which time plea negotiations were unsuccessful. The 
transcript contained in the Record also indicates that a negotiated 
plea bargain had been available to McDonald up until the day before 
the hearing and subsequent bench trial. (Record, p. 74.) Finally, 
McDonald obviously has no right to a plea bargain, and she has not 
provided case law that would indicate otherwise. 
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McDonald's second argument is that she was prejudiced when the 
Motion for Continuance was denied, because her trial preparation 
was geared to presenting her case to a jury, and she did not have 
time to adjust her trial strategy for a bench trial. This argument 
once again ignores the facts cf the case and conflicts with her own 
argument regarding the Motion for Jury Trial hearing. On June 13, 
1996, the court issued a Notice of Bench Trial. (Record, p. 34.) 
Therefore, she had seven days' notice that the trial to be held on 
June 20, if any, was to be a bench trial. Any preparations she 
made should have been made for a bench trial. By her own argument 
on page 22 of Appellant's Brief, McDonald acknowledges that no jury 
was assembled on June 20 and that the court would have had to grant 
a continuance to assemble a jury had it granted her Motion for Jury 
Trial. Therefore, it is crystal clear that she was well aware that 
no jury trial would be held on June 20, and that if any trial was 
to be held, it would be a bench trial. If she was unprepared to 
proceed with a bench trial on that date, it is wholly through the 
fault of McDonald and her counsel, and certainly not the fault of 
the court. 
McDonald's argument, that she was prejudiced and that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying her a hearing date 
prior to the trial date and in denying her Motion for Continuance, 
is without merit, and should be disregarded by this Court. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN SENTENCING MCDONALD TO A 
FINE THAT EXCEEDS THE RECOMMENDED FINE 
SET FORTH IN THE UNIFORM FINE SCHEDULE. 
It is well established that trial court judges have wide 
discretion in their sentencing decisions. In State v. Wright, 
893 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the court stated: 
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal 
unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion, failed to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits. State v. 
Nutall, 861 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah App. 1993); 
accord State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 
(Utah 1989) . An abuse of discretion may be 
manifest if the actions of the judge in 
sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the 
judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence. 
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 
1990) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978). The exercise of discretion 
in sentencing necessarily reflects the 
personal judgment of the court and the 
appellate court can properly find abuse only 
if it can be said that no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial 
court. Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887 {citing State 
v. Harris, 10 Wash. App. 509, 518 P.2d 237 
(Wash. 1974) . 
Wright, at 1120. 
The court has also stated: "This court Amay only find abuse 
"if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court."'" Yoder, at 548. 
Contrary to McDonald's assertion otherwise, the bail set in 
this case was $57, as shown in the notice of the citation. 
(Record, p. 1.) The sentence imposed by the court was a fine of 
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$60 and attendance at traffic school, which costs $30 to attend. 
This fine and traffic school requirement are obviously within the 
$0 to $750 range of fines applicable to infractions. 
The penalty in this case is certainly not excessive, 
inherently unfair, or such that no reasonable person would take the 
view adopted by the trial court. 
Finally, in her argument McDonald refers to the Uniform Fine 
Schedule as if it set a mandatory fine amount from which the judge 
cannot stray. This is certainly not the law in Utah. 
Section 76-3-301.5(5) of the Utah Code, which establishes the 
Uniform Fine Schedule, specifically states: "This section does not 
prohibit the court from in its discretion imposing no fine, or a 
fine in any amount up to and including the maximum fine, for the 
offense." 
McDonald makes no credible argument supporting her claims that 
the sentence was excessive or unfair. Therefore, the sentencing 
decision of the trial court should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully requests that 
McDonald's appeal be denied, and that the conviction be affirmed. 
DATED this C >> day of July, 1997. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
Vv^jJ Richard Catten, Senior Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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